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Abstract 
Policies that would create net benefits for society but would also involve costs frequently lack 
the necessary support to be enacted because losses loom larger than gains psychologically. To 
reduce the harmful consequence of loss aversion, we propose a new type of policy bundling 
technique in which related bills that have both costs and benefits are combined.  In our first 
laboratory study, we confirm across a set of four legislative domains that this bundling technique 
increases support for bills that have both costs and benefits.  We also show in a second study that 
this effect stems from a diminished focus on losses and heightened focus on gains when policies 
are evaluated in bundled form. 
 
Keywords:  loss aversion; policy bundling; behavioral economics 
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Introduction 
Citizens hope their elected representatives will pass legislation that creates net gains that 
outweigh net harms—legislation that has positive expected value for society.  However, Nobel 
Laureate Joseph Stiglitz (1998) has noted that legislators often fail to pass such legislation, even 
when the net positive expected value is highly significant.  Social scientists have pointed to the 
dysfunctional role of special interest groups in contorting our political processes and contributing 
to sub-optimal outcomes (Baron, 1998), and several cognitive explanations for the failure to pass 
legislation with positive expected value have also been discussed (Baron, Bazerman, & Shonk, 
2006; Ritov & Baron, 2009).  This paper highlights one cognitive barrier to passing legislation 
with positive expected value for society and proposes a solution. 
The psychology and economics literature suggests that legislators face an uphill battle 
when proposing legislation that has both costs and benefits due to the power of loss aversion, a 
cognitive bias that causes individuals to dramatically overweight losses relative to gains 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  Because losses loom larger than 
gains psychologically, policies that would create net benefits for society but would also involve 
costs may frequently be defeated.  Policymakers would thus benefit from learning how to combat 
loss aversion and reduce its impact on the perception of legislation with both costs and benefits. 
To achieve this, we propose a specialized type of policy bundling.   
Legislators frequently combine unrelated policies supported by different groups into a 
single bill to increase support for their legislation.  For example, conservatives might add a 
consumer protection law to their proposed budget to garner liberal support.  We propose a 
different type of bundling technique: one in which related bills are combined in a way that 
reduces the harmful effects of the tendency to irrationally overweight losses relative to gains. 
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Our proposed policy bundling method combines one bill that has costs in Domain A (e.g., job 
losses in Town X) and benefits in Domain B (e.g., acres of forest preserved in Town X) with a 
matched bill that has the inverse structure: benefits in Domain A (e.g., job gains in Town Y) and 
costs in Domain B (e.g., acres of forest lost in Town Y). Within each domain, costs of a specific 
type (e.g., job losses in Town X) in one bill must be offset by greater benefits of the same type 
(e.g., job gains in Town Y) in the second bill (see Table 1).     
When such bills are evaluated independently, we hypothesize that losses will be 
comparatively more salient, and people’s aversion to losses will drive high rates of opposition.  
Even if precisely the same information is presented in a bundled piece of legislation as in two 
independent bills, because losses cancel out in the combined bill (by design), gains will be 
comparatively more salient, and loss aversion will exert less influence.  Thus, when a bundled 
bill is evaluated, we predict it will achieve considerably greater support than either of its 
component bills and will in fact be valued more than the sum of its parts. 
Study 1 
Method 
168 participants were recruited to participate in an hour-long set of studies in a computer 
lab on a large university campus in the Northeastern United States in exchange for $15.  
Participants completed our study at computer terminals and then participated in two other 
unrelated studies. 
During our study, participants were presented with four different hypothetical pieces of 
legislation, each with a different cost-versus-benefit tradeoff.  For example, one cost-benefit 
tradeoff involved cutting jobs but gaining acres of protected forest in a hypothetical community 
while the matched bill involved a gain of jobs but a loss of acres.   Each piece of legislation was 
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either a single bill pertaining to an individual policy with costs and benefits or a combined bill 
where the costs and benefits of two separate bills summed to generate net benefits in two 
domains.  For the tradeoff highlighted above, participants were randomly assigned to view one of 
the following three bills:   
 Bill 1: A law to establish new park areas in Community X where logging would 
be prohibited, costing the community 100 jobs but preserving 60,000 acres of 
forest;  
 Bill 2: A law to eliminate a protected park area in Community Y, which would 
allow logging on 50,000 acres of previously protected forest, destroying that 
forest region but creating 125 new jobs;  
 Combined Bill: A bundled bill presenting the proposals in both Bill 1 and Bill 2 
above, together as two components of a single piece of legislation.   
The three other types of tradeoffs studied included (see Table 2): 
(1) A tradeoff between reduced/(increased) hours of gridlock and more/(fewer) fender 
benders due to the absence/(presence) of a traffic light at a dangerous intersection. 
(2) A tradeoff between more/(fewer) hours of scheduled brownouts and fewer/(more) 
pollution-related health complaints due to fewer/(more) power plants. 
(3) A tradeoff between an increase/(reduction) in a city’s capacity for children in its 
playgrounds and an increase/(decrease) in the number of disease-carrying rodents in the 
city attracted by the increased/(decreased) presence of playground spaces.1 
After viewing the details of a given policy (see online supplement for study materials), 
participants were asked if they would vote for or against the bill in question.  Participants who 
had voted for/(against) a bill were then asked how many hours they would want their legislator to 
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devote to supporting/(opposing) the passage of the bill – a measure of the strength of their 
support for the legislation.  Strength of support is tabulated as the number of hours a participant 
would want his or her legislator to spend supporting a bill’s passage, with hours spent in 
opposition taking on negative values.  In other words, if one participant voted for a bill and 
indicated she would want her legislator to spend 3 hours supporting its passage, her strength of 
support in hours would be classified as 3.  If another participant voted against the bill and 
indicated she would want her legislator to spend 2 hours opposing its passage, her strength of 
support in hours would be classified as -2.  This strength of support measure captures precisely 
how much an individual values a given outcome, following the traditional economic measure of 
“willingness to pay.”  
Results and Discussion 
As illustrated in Table 2, in each of the four policy domains studied, we find that support 
for a combined bill is significantly greater than support for either of its separate, component bills. 
For example, for the jobs/forestry policies described above, 83% of participants indicated they 
would vote for the Combined Bill, a significantly greater show of support than that achieved 
independently by either Bill 1 (54%; p < 0.01) or Bill 2 (45%; p < 0.01).  These findings 
substantiate our contention that policy bundling may be an effective tool for policymakers 
hoping to pass legislation that is advantageous overall, but that contains obvious and unavoidable 
costs.  
Further, by measuring the strength of support for each bill, we are able to determine 
whether this finding could be explained by voters favoring one policy in a bundle more strongly 
than they oppose the other, and thus voting to pass a joint bill when they would not support one 
of its component bills.  If such compromise were responsible for our findings, strength of support 
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in legislator hours for each combined bill should equal the net strength of support in hours for its 
component bills.  We show, however, in every one of the four policy domains studied that policy 
bundling is not effective due to compromise. The average number of hours a participant would 
want his or her legislator to devote to supporting two separate bills sums to significantly fewer 
hours than the average number of hours a participant would want his or her legislator to devote 
to supporting the combined bill (see Table 2).2  For example, for the jobs/forestry policies 
described above, participants reported that, on average, they would want their legislator to spend 
a total of 24 hours working to support the passage of the Combined Bill – significantly more 
time, on average, than participants reported they would want their legislator to spend, in total, 
working to support Bill 1 (1 hour) and Bill 2 (-31 hours) (see Table 2).3  We therefore conclude 
that our results are due to a psychological difference between the way people evaluate individual 
bills with salient costs versus the way they evaluate combined legislation where the costs 
embedded in individual bills are overshadowed by their net benefits.   
Study 2 
 While the hypotheses tested and supported by Study 1 stem from previous research on 
loss aversion, Study 1’s design does not allow us to evaluate the mechanism leading to increased 
support for bundled policies.  To determine whether, as predicted, a reduction in the salience of 
losses in bundled legislation is responsible for the higher levels of support we observe for 
bundled policies relative to their component policies, we conducted a second study.  In Study 2, 
we investigated the reasoning that led people to support or oppose different pieces of legislation. 
Method 
314 participants were recruited to participate in an hour-long set of studies in a computer 
lab on a large university campus in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States in exchange for 
POLICY BUNDLING TO OVERCOME LOSS AVERSION 8 
 
$10.  Participants completed our study at computer terminals and then participated in a series of 
other unrelated studies. 
Each participant was presented with a single, hypothetical piece of legislation.  
Participants were randomly assigned to view one of three versions of the legislation from Study 
1 involving a tradeoff between jobs and acres of protected forest (see online supplement): (1) Bill 
1, which involved job losses and acreage gains (N=124), (2) Bill 2, which involved job gains and 
acreage losses (N=115), or (3) Combined Bill, which presented Bills 1 and 2 together as a single 
piece of legislation (N=75).  Participants were first asked if they supported the bill in question.  
Then they were asked to “write a paragraph describing [their] thought process as [they] 
approached the decision and the reasons [they] came to [their] conclusion.”   
Results and Discussion 
As in Study 1, we find that support for a combined bill is significantly greater than 
support for either of its separate, component bills. 87% of participants indicated they would vote 
for the Combined Bill, a significantly greater show of support than that achieved independently 
by either Bill 1 (56%; p < 0.01) or Bill 2 (45%; p < 0.01).   
Two research assistants who were blind to our hypotheses and experimental conditions 
were trained to code participants’ reported thought processes.  Coders were asked to answer two 
questions: (1) Does the free response make any mention of losses/costs (or any synonym) (y/n)? 
and (2) Does the free response make any mention of benefits/gains (or any synonym) (y/n)?  An 
agreement rate of 75% (kappa = 0.51, p < 0.01) was achieved for coding losses/costs, and an 
agreement rate of 72% (kappa = 0.45, p < 0.01) was achieved for coding benefits/gains.  
Thoughts of losses/(gains) were coded as present (code=1) or absent (code=0) when both coders 
agreed, and in cases of disagreement, the codes were averaged (code=0.5). 
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 As predicted, we found that significantly fewer participants were coded as thinking about 
losses when evaluating the Combined Bill (31%) than when evaluating Bill 1 (66%; p < 0.01) or 
Bill 2 (56%; p < 0.01).  In addition, significantly more participants were coded as thinking about 
gains when evaluating the Combined Bill (86%) than when evaluating Bill 1 (44%; p < 0.01) or 
Bill 2 (62%; p < 0.01).  These results support our prediction that policy bundling reduces the 
salience of losses in legislation’s component parts and heightens the salience of gains.   
General Discussion 
We believe the policy bundling method discussed above has the potential to help citizens 
and legislators pass legislation with net benefits but salient costs. Single pieces of legislation 
often fail to gain the necessary support for enactment because they are narrowly bracketed, and 
thus legislators are unable to overcome loss aversion. We hope that the bundling method 
proposed in this paper may help legislators move beyond the irrational reluctance to support wise 
legislation that loss aversion can induce.  
Previous research highlighting policy applications of loss aversion has proven extremely 
valuable.  A knowledge of people’s tendency to view any deviation from the status quo as an 
aversive loss (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) has helped policymakers understand the 
enormous implications of defaults on important issues such as organ donation (Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2004) and 401k participation (Madrian & Shea, 2001).  We believe that knowledge of 
a strategy for overcoming loss aversion through bundling could similarly help policymakers pass 
better legislation. 
While the behavioral decision research literature has shown the  difficulty of fully 
debiasing human judgment (see Milkman, Chugh & Bazerman, 2009 for a review), we can 
design decision-making contexts in ways that lead to wiser choices (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
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By using our bundling strategy, policymakers may be better able to overcome the pitfalls of loss 
aversion and, in turn, affect more positive legislative change. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1   
Illustration of new policy bundling concept, where n, 
m > 0.   
 Domain A Domain B 
Bill 1 Costs of Size X Benefits of Size Y 
Bill 2 Benefits of Size X + n Costs of Size Y – m 
 
Table 2   
Study results.  For each tradeoff, participants were randomly assigned to evaluate Bill 1, Bill 2, or a 
Combined Bill. 
 
 
 
  
Tradeoff Bill 1 Bill 2 Combined Bill
Bill Contents -100 jobs, +60,000 acres +125 jobs, -50,000 acres Bill 1 and Bill 2
YES Votes 54%** 45%** 83%
Avg. WTP in Legislator Hours 1 -31 24**
Bill Contents -6,000 hours, +10 accidents +4,000 hours, -15 accidents Bill 1 and Bill 2
YES Votes 58%** 38%** 84%
Avg. WTP in Legislator Hours -51 -8 31*
Bill Contents -1,000 hours, + 10 health +800 hours, -12 health Bill 1 and Bill 2
YES Votes 41%** 23%** 66%
Avg. WTP in Legislator Hours -10 -17 22**
Bill Contents +250 kids, +250 rodents -225 kids, -300 rodents Bill 1 and Bill 2
YES Votes 37%** 76%† 89%
Avg. WTP in Legislator Hours -38 15 26*
†Significant at 10% level. *Significant at 5% level.  **Significant at the 1% level.
One-tailed two-sample proportion tests reveal that in each domain, the Combined Bill receives significantly more support than either Bill 1 or Bill 2.  One-tailed linear 
hypothesis tests following OLS regressions to predict participants' WTP for a bill in legislator hours with dummies for Bill 1, Bill 2 and the Combined Bill (constant supressed) 
in each domain show that the sum of the coefficients on Bill 1 and Bill 2 is always significantly less than the coefficient on the Combined Bill.  N=168 for Jobs vs. Acres and 
Brownouts vs. Health Complaints; N = 116 for Gridlock vs. Accidents and Playgrounds vs. Rodents.
City's Capacity for Children in Its Playgrounds 
vs. Number of Disease Carrying Rodents in the 
City (attracted by presence of playgrounds)
Jobs (due to logging) vs. Acres of Protected 
Forest (due to forest protection laws prohibiting 
logging)
Hours of Gridlock (due to traffic light) vs. 
Number of Fender Benders (due to dangerous 
intersection with no light)
Hours of Scheduled Brownouts (due to power 
shortages) vs. Number of Pollution-Related 
Health Complaints (due to power plant operation)
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Appendix 
 
Questions Asked of Participants about Each Bill after They Read Its Contents 
 
 Do you support this bill? 
__ YES  __ NO 
 
[PAGE BREAK] 
 
 How many dollars would you be willing to donate to support4 the passage of this bill?: 
____________ dollars 
 
 How many hours would you be willing to spend making phone calls to support4 the 
passage of this bill?: 
____________ hours 
 
 How many miles would you be willing to walk in a walkathon to support4 the passage of 
this bill?: 
____________ miles 
 
 If you were a member of community X, how many hours of his/her time would you want 
your local representative to devote to supporting4 the passage of this bill?: 
____________ hours 
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Table A1 
Summary of strength of support responses for Bill 1, Bill 2 and Combined Bill. 
 
 
  
Tradeoff Bill 1 Bill 2 Combined Bill
Bill Contents -100 jobs, +60,000 acres +125 jobs, -50,000 acres Bill 1 and Bill 2
1 -31 24**
(9) (10) (10)
6,792 -84,158 -18,490
(43,954) (47,821) (45,553)
-3 -7 3**
(3) (3) (3)
1 -194 4
(97) (107) (105)
Bill Contents -6,000 hours, +10 accidents +4,000 hours, -15 accidents Bill 1 and Bill 2
-51 -8 31*
(31) (31) (32)
-390 -8 2,843
(1,529) (1,569) (1,591)
-11 -2 14*
(7) (7) (7)
-1 -22 4
(12) (12) (12)
Bill Contents -1,000 hours, + 10 health +800 hours, -12 health Bill 1 and Bill 2
-10 -17 22**
(10) (11) (11)
-241 -1,082 -18,167
(9,714) (11,336) (10,479)
-4 -2 0*
(2) (2) (2)
-4 -2 18
(10) (11) (10)
Bill Contents +250 kids, +250 rodents -225 kids, -300 rodents Bill 1 and Bill 2
-38 15 26*
(16) (17) (15)
-12 -2,974 376
(1,591) (1,662) (1,456)
-22 6 -1
(13) (13) (12)
-55 4 4
(30) (32) (28)
Avg. WTP in 
Legislator Hours
Avg. WTP in 
Donation Dollars
Avg. WTP in Hours 
Fundraising
Avg. WTP in 
Walkathon Miles
Hours of Gridlock 
(due to traffic 
light) vs. Number 
of Fender Benders 
(due to dangerous 
intersection with 
no light)
Avg. WTP in 
Legislator Hours
Jobs (due to 
logging) vs. Acres 
of Protected Forest 
(due to forest 
protection laws 
prohibiting 
logging)
Avg. WTP in 
Donation Dollars
Avg. WTP in Hours 
Fundraising
Hours of 
Scheduled 
Brownouts (due to 
power shortages) 
vs. Number of 
Pollution-Related 
Health Complaints 
(due to power plant 
operation)
Avg. WTP in 
Legislator Hours
Avg. WTP in 
Donation Dollars
Avg. WTP in Hours 
Fundraising
Avg. WTP in 
Walkathon Miles
Avg. WTP in 
Walkathon Miles
†Significant at 10% level. *Significant at 5% level.  **Significant at the 1% level.
One-tailed linear hypothesis tests following OLS regressions to predict participants' WTP for a bill in legislator hours with dummies for 
Bill 1, Bill 2 and the Combined Bill (constant supressed) in each domain show that the sum of the coefficients on Bill 1 and Bill 2 is 
always significantly less than the coefficient on the Combined Bill.  Standard errors from OLS regressions are in parentheses.
City's Capacity for 
Children in Its 
Playgrounds vs. 
Number of Disease 
Carrying Rodents 
in the City 
(attracted by 
presence of 
playground spaces)
Avg. WTP in 
Legislator Hours
Avg. WTP in 
Donation Dollars
Avg. WTP in Hours 
Fundraising
Avg. WTP in 
Walkathon Miles
POLICY BUNDLING TO OVERCOME LOSS AVERSION 15 
 
Footnotes 
 
1     Only 116 participants responded to tradeoffs involving gridlock vs. fender benders and 
playground capacity vs. rodents.   
2     For all tradeoffs, one-tailed linear hypothesis tests conducted following regressions to predict 
participants' strength of support for a bill in legislator hours with dummies for Bill 1, Bill 2, and 
the Combined Bill (constant suppressed) show that the sum of the coefficients on Bill 1 and Bill 
2 is significantly less than the coefficient on the Combined Bill. 
3     Three other measures of strength of support for each bill were also collected, each involving 
a participant’s willingness to commit his/her own resources to supporting or opposing a given 
piece of legislation (hours, dollars, or miles walked).  These additional measures exhibit patterns 
similar to those presented in Table 2 pertaining to hours a participant would want his/her 
legislator to spend supporting or opposing a bill’s passage, although nearly half of participants 
were unwilling to commit any of their own resources to supporting or opposing legislation, 
leading to a reduction in the sensitivity of these three measures (due to high variance in strength 
of support responses).  Appendix Table A1 presents detailed statistics for all strength of support 
data collected. 
4     If participant selected “yes” in response to the question - “Do you support this bill?”, this 
read “support.” Otherwise, this read “oppose”. 
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Supporting Online Materials 
 
The wording of each bill presented to participants for each of the four tradeoffs studied: 
 
Tradeoff 1 
 
About Community X: 
 
Community X is situated in the middle of the National Forest. 
Community X has high overall unemployment. 
Community X employs many individuals in the foresting industry. 
The average yearly wage of loggers in community X is $41,000. 
 
About the National Forest: 
 
The National Forest encompasses 1,000,000 acres. 
One square mile is equal to 640 acres. 
600,000 acres of the National Forest are currently leased to logging firms. 
 
[Bills 1 and 2] 
 
This Bill: 
 
Within the eastern part of the National Forest, there is a [B1:  60,000]/[B2:  50,000] acre parcel of land 
that has been logged over the last 125 years and is currently [B1:  leased to a private timber firm.  The 
lease]/[B2:  protected from logging.  The land’s protected status] expires this year. This bill would not 
renew the [B1:  lease]/[B2:  protected status], and would [B1:  protect the parcel of land from further 
harvesting]/[B2:  permit leasing of this parcel of land for logging]. This would result in the [B1:  loss of 
100]/[B2:  creation of 125] jobs for the foreseeable future in Community X. 
 
Change in Community X Jobs Change in Protected Acres 
[B1: 100 Jobs LOST]/ 
[B2:  125 Jobs Gained] 
[B1:  60,000 Acres GAINED]/ 
[B2:  50,000 Acres LOST] 
 
 
[Combined Bill] 
 
This bill has two parts: 
 
PART A. [Text of Bill 1 from above]. 
 
PART B. [Text of Bill 2 from above]. 
 
Bill Change in Community X Jobs Change in Protected Acres 
A 100 Jobs LOST 60,000 Acres GAINED 
B 125 Jobs GAINED 50,000 Acres LOST 
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Tradeoff 2 
 
About the State Highway: 
 
One 5-mile stretch of the State Highway near downtown is known for its frequent accidents, with an 
average of 100 fender-benders per year. 
 
Traffic lights on highways reduce the number of fender-benders, but increase the amount of time 
commuters must spend to travel the same distance. 
 
[Bills 1 and 2] 
 
The State Legislature is considering the following bill.  
 
This bill would [B1: remove]/[B2: add] a traffic light [B1:  from]/[B2:  to] a specific section of the 5-mile 
stretch of State Highway. This would [B1: reduce]/[B2:  increase] the total amount of time spent on the 5-
mile stretch by all drivers combined over the course of a year by a total of [B1:  6,000]/[B2:  4,000] hours. 
However, it would result in [B1: 10 more]/[B2: 15 fewer] fender-benders per year on the State Highway. 
 
Change in Gridlock hours Change in Fender-Benders 
[B1: 6,000 Hours LESS TRAFFIC] 
[B2: 4,000 Hours MORE TRAFFIC] 
[B1: 10 MORE 
[B2: 15 FEWER] 
 
 
[Combined Bill] 
 
The State Legislature is considering the following bill. This bill has two parts: 
 
PART A. [Text of Bill 1 from above]. 
 
PART B. [Text of Bill 2 from above]. 
 
Bill Change in Gridlock hours Change in Fender-Benders 
A 6,000 Hours LESS TRAFFIC 10 MORE 
B 4,000 Hours MORE TRAFFIC 15 FEWER 
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Tradeoff 3  
 
About State X: 
 
State X is a suburban community in the United States. 
 
State X has energy plants that generate enough power to meet the energy needs of its residents and 
businesses, with occasional shortages. When shortages arise, the power companies announce pre-planned 
blackouts. During these pre-planned blackouts, electricity is shut off for a pre-scheduled period of time in 
pre-determined areas. 
 
The State Legislature is considering the following bill: 
 
[Bill 1] 
 
This bill would lead to the construction of a new energy plant in Town A within State X. This will reduce 
power shortages and reduce the number of pre-planned blackouts. The new energy plant will reduce the 
number of blackout hours in Town A by 1,000 hours every year. However, the new plant will increase the 
amount of pollution in Town A. It is expected that 10 more pollution-related health complaints will be 
filed annually as a result of the construction of a new plant. 
 
Change in Total Hours of  
Pre-planned Blackouts 
Change in Pollution-Related  
Health Complaints 
1,000 FEWER Hours 10 MORE Filed Complaints 
 
 
[Bill 2] 
 
This bill would lead to the closure of one of the existing energy plants in Town B within State X. This 
will reduce the amount of pollution in Town B, and it is expected that 12 fewer pollution-related health 
complaints will be filed annually. However, shutting down an energy plant will increase the number of 
pre-planned blackouts. This will result in an expected increase of 800 more hours of pre-planned 
blackouts every year. 
 
Change in Total Hours of  
Pre-planned Blackouts 
Change in Pollution-Related  
Health Complaints 
800 MORE Hours 12 MORE Filed Complaints 
 
 
[Combined Bill] 
 
The State Legislature is considering the following bill. This bill has two parts: 
 
PART A. [Text of Bill 1 from above]. 
 
PART B. [Text of Bill 2 from above]. 
 
Bill Change in Total Hours of  
Pre-planned Blackouts 
Change in Pollution-Related  
Health Complaints 
A 1,000 FEWER Hours 10 MORE Filed Complaints 
B 800 MORE Hours 12 MORE Filed Complaints 
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About City Y: 
 
City Y is a densely populated metropolitan community in the United States 
 
[Bills 1 and 2] 
 
The Municipal Legislature is considering the following bill: 
 
This bill proposes renovating the current downtown by [B1:  adding a new]/[B2:  removing an existing] 
playground with the capacity for [B1: 250]/[B2: 225] children. [B1:  However,] it has been carefully 
determined that [B1: building a new playground in the designated area]/[B2: removing this particular 
playground] is likely to [B1: increase]/[B2: reduce] the population of disease-carrying rodents in the city 
by [B1: 250]/[B2: 300]. 
 
Change in City’s Playground Capacity Change in City’s Disease-Carrying Rodent Population 
[B1:  Capacity for 250 MORE Children]/ 
[B2:  Capacity for 225 FEWER Children] 
[B1: 250 MORE Disease-Carrying Rodents]/ 
[B2:  300 FEWER Disease-Carrying Rodents] 
 
 
[Combined Bill] 
 
The Municipal Legislature is considering the following bill. This bill has two parts: 
 
PART A. [Exact text of Bill 1 from above]. 
 
PART B. [Exact text of Bill 2 from above]. 
 
Bill Change in City’s Playground Capacity Change in City’s Disease-Carrying Rodent Population 
A Capacity for 250 MORE Children 250 MORE Disease-Carrying Rodents 
B Capacity for 225 FEWER Children 300 FEWER Disease-Carrying Rodents 
 
 
 
 
 
